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Abstract. This paper discusses the philosophical and logical motiva-
tions for rejectivism, primarily by considering a dialogical approach to
logic, which is formalized in a Question-Answer Semantics (QAS). We
develop a generalised account of rejectivism through close consideration
of Mark Textor’s arguments against rejectivism that the negative ex-
pression ‘no’is never used as an act of rejection and is equivalent with a
negative sentence. In doing so, we also shed light upon well-known issues
regarding the supposed non-embeddability and non-iterability of force
indicators. We finish by highlighting the benefits of our approach with
regard to the categoricity of logics, and also a conditional that intends
to solve the Frege-Geach Problem.
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1. Introduction
This paper offers a generalised account of rejectivism. To do so, we first pro-
vide an analysis of conditions it is thought that any such account must meet,
by considering Mark Textor’s [32] opposition to rejectivism, summarised as
follows:
I will argue that “yes” and “no” embed in answers to propositional
questions. Hence, they are not force-indicators and one cannot ab-
stract a sign of rejection from negative answers to propositional
questions.
Our reply will consist of three steps. First, we argue that affirmation and
negation are prostatements rather than “yes” and “no” being prosentences
The order of author’s names is arbitrary.
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(as Textor claimed). Second, we challenge the view according to which non-
embeddability and non-iteratibility are necessary preconditions for being a
force indicator. Third, we propose a better formalism for setting out the
dialogical foundation of logic, which includes a strengthened definition of
the conditional that is capable of dealing with Textor’s arguments against
the standard conditional. We finish by highlighting the advantages of our
approach in relation to other forms of rejectivism, with particular attention
to the response to Textor given in [11].
1.1. Rejectivism
Typical attempts to construe an inferentialist theory of meaning are unilat-
eralist, providing an account of meaning in terms of the validity of certain
inferences, which is itself explained in terms of the conditions under which
certain propositions may be asserted [4, 18]. Bilateralism is the view that
meaning is, rather, to be construed in terms of the conditions on both asser-
tion and denial. So, bilateralism is a form of rejectivism, which takes rejection
to be on a par with, and equally foundational as, assertion [19, 22, 30]. In
particular, this view takes it that the grasp that we have on speech acts of as-
sertion and denial is prior to (in the order of explanation) our understanding
of negation. So, rather than derive the rejection of p from the assertion of ¬p,
in fact ¬p is to be explained in terms of the fundamental role of rejection.1
In order to adequately account for these dual roles, the rejectivist must
distinguish between force and content. For any content, it should be possible
to mark it with the force of assertion, or the force of denial. In Rumfitt [25],
this is formalised with “signed” sentences +p and −p, signifying the force-
markers on sentential metavariables. According to Rumfitt, this should be
taken to formally capture the English language form of a question-forming
sentence p?, with the answer “yes” or “no”.2 As such, rejectivism is not
merely supposed to be a formal account, but also to capture something of
ordinary linguistic practice.
By way of explanation, our own view builds upon this view with the
slogan that: “Meaning is not only, but eventually Use”.3 Our view is that
rules make sense insofar as they are understood as a normative theory on
the manipulation of speech-acts within a question-answer game. In brief,
sentences are the materials used to play this game, and rules are introduced
in order for the game to make sense, but sentences make no sense when there
is no speaker to do something with them. So, the implementation of inference
1An immediate benefit is that it becomes possible to construct an inferentialist approach
to classical logic, formalised by a signed calculus [30], or a multiple-conclusion calculus
[22]. In contrast, here we begin from a dialogical approach to logic based on rejectivism,
and consider the various logical structures that may be constructed in this context (further
work in this area can be found in [26, 33]).
2The formalism adopted here does not follow Rumfitt’s “signed” sentences, but rather
provides a direct framework for approaching answers to question-forming sentences.
3“Eventually” echoes with: “sooner or later” in the title: the status of proto-statements
or embedded ‘yes’ - ‘no’ answers inside prostatements, before these become prostatements
themselves.
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rules through the expression of sentences (or sentential contents) provides an
essential explanation of the role of logic with respect to the compatibility and
incompatibility of speech-acts.
By way of analogy, we may consider an outfield football player to be
required to play in two possible ways, namely: attacking, or defending. What
else? These two attitudes are not to be compared with truth and falsity
but, rather, with assertion and denial as two different attitudes towards the
same goal: scoring once more than the opponent, in football; taking correct
decisions, in logic.4 It is taken for granted that a player cannot attack and
defend in one and the same action at once. Yet, a midfield player may be
considered as an intermediary position whose function varies with the context:
as a support for the defenders, when his team does not have the ball; as a
support for the strikers, when it does. Against a black-and-white view of
roles in a team, we similarly want to consider a more graded view of speech-
acts with assertion and denial. Then, the implementation of inference rules
through the expression of sentences (or sentential contents) gives an essential
explanation of this and lies at the core of logic as we understand it.5
In this context, rejectivism may be understood to provide coherence
conditions over the game as a whole.6 Nonetheless, it is clear that for rejec-
tivism to even get off the ground, it must be the case that “no” can operate
as a force-indicator, in at least some cases. According to Textor, however, if
“no” is a force-indicator, then it fails a version of the Frege-Geach problem.
If “no” is not a force-indicator, then it is simply a prosentence that may be
construed as an assertion of a negation. Either way, rejectivism fails.
1.2. Question-Answer Semantics (QAS)
To clarify these issues, rather than work in the signed sentences framework, we
work with the original suggestion that “yes” and “no” can be understood in a
question-answer framework. Textor [32] calls for a better regimentation and
generalised structure by which to account for rejectivism. Here, we provide
such a full and generalised account by means of QAS. Let us briefly introduce
the general framework here.
Following the inferentialist context of this discussion, we distinguish be-
tween sense and reference [4]. However, our framework is explicitly dialogical
in its approach to a logic based primarily on speech acts. This is formalized
by means of a generalised rejectivist-minded semantics based on yes- and
4For elanboration of these points, see [autor reference omitted].
5What follows therefore builds upon the dialogical tradition in logic, an overview of which
is in [12], whilst differing in terms of the formal structure so that we have more flexibility
than standard particle rules for negation.
6For example, Ripley [24] takes the following conditions as fundamental:
• The assertion of α and the denial of α are incompatible speech-acts;
• Having a settled opinion about α requires that one is willing to either assert α or
deny α.
Whether or not these are ought to be assumed, we consider in §2.1.
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no-answers to corresponding questions (QAS).7 In brief, the sense of a sen-
tence is a set of questions related to its content, and the reference is a set of
correlated answers. So, on this view, Q(p) expresses the sense of an arbitrary
sentence p and A(p) denotes its reference. In relation to Frege’s philosophy
of language, our view departs in that a reference of a sentence is not a tradi-
tional truth-value i.e. an objective and single property of a sentence. Rather,
it is a relatively complex answer made by a speaker in terms of yes-no an-
swers, where the complexity of an answer depends upon the speaker’s criteria
of justification for a sentence.8 The reference of a sentence is a logical value,
but it is not strictly speaking a truth-value: a sentence may be uttered as the
content of an order, request, or even fear to be expressed in a that-clause.9
Rather, logical values are a combination of yes-no answers to questions con-
cerning an utterance, and each single answer is either affirmative or negative.
Accepting and rejecting a given sentence are thus expressed by an affirma-
tion (“yes”) and a denial (“no”), but these answers do not exclusively concern
declarative acts; they can be applied to any other speech act. The concept
of truth is not absent from this assertoric logic, but it is no longer embed-
ded into the reference of sentences; rather, it is included in sentences’ sense,
since truth occurs as the predicate of the corresponding question. More im-
portantly, not only one question is put by Q(p): if the speaker gives their
opinion about the truth-value of a sentence p, they need not assert either its
truth or its falsehood. They may still make a conjecture, or doubt it. In the
rest of the paper, our attention will be focused on a single pair of speech-acts,
namely: assertion, and rejection. More especially, we will make use of AR4
(A for acceptance, and R for rejection) as a four-valued logical system that
make senses of yes- and no-answers in such dialogical situations.
This formal device has a threefold purpose. First, it focuses on the
two-sided aspect of meaning through the two independent speech-acts of
assertion and denial. Second, it intends to show this striking feature (as a
Janus face) within an ordered pair of valuations A(p) = 〈a1(p),a2(p)〉, each
of which combine various attitudes towards opposite sentences such as p
and ¬p. Third, it brings to light an asymmetry within truth and falsity, on
the one hand, and assertion (truth-claim, when positive; falsity-claim, when
negative) and rejection on the other. Our point is that the latter attitude is
not a single one and can be split into a strong reading (as a commitment
of negative assertion, or falsity-claim) and a weak reading (as a mere denial
7We take it that the motivations for QAS accords both with Smiley’s [30] and Textor’s [32,
p.447] philosophical construal of rejection. See [26] for further details.
8Nonetheless, the distinction between sense and reference explains how judgments can be
embedded, where, in section 2.3, it will be argued that such embedding reproduce the
Fregean account of opaque contexts or referential opacity, according to which a reference
turns into a sense once it is in a specific context of discourse. That is: any judgment
embedded into another judgment turns into a sentence, whilst the entire judgment still
makes sense.
9For a corresponding account of truth and falsity, see [2].
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of value-claim).10 So, with respect to the degree of force, affirmation and
denial may be either strong or weak, depending upon the speaker’s answers.
Moreover, with respect to sentential content, affirmation and denial may be
either affirmative or negative, depending upon the sentential contents. As
such, we can give the following clauses:
Affirmation is a speech act such that ai(p) = 1
Assertion is a strong affirmation, i.e a speech act such that
a1(p) = 1 and a2(p) = 0
Rejection is a speech act such that ai(p) = 0
Negative assertion is a strong rejection, i.e., a speech act such
that a1(p) = 0 and a2(p) = 1
Rejectivists stress the logical independence of assertion and rejection,
such that rejection is not reducible to the act of assertion applied to a negative
sentence. Correspondingly, our question-answer game requires at least two
main questions to characterize the meaning of a sentence (that is, in its
inferential use). These are asked to a speaker, where the expression of “being”
true is relative to the speaker’s criteria of truth-ascription as follows:
“Is p true?”, i.e. “Is the truth of p asserted?”: q1(p)
“Is p false?”, i.e. “Is the falsity of p asserted?”: q2(p) = q1(¬p)
At least two sorts of answers are available to the speaker for each question
qi(p), namely:
“Yes”, i.e. assertion: ai(p) = 1
“No”, i.e. rejection: ai(p) = 0
Moreover, we also have the following equivalence rule for questions, to the
effect that an answer to the truth (falsity) of an affirmative sentence p is
equivalent to an answer to the falsity (truth) of its negation ¬p. For instance,
asking “Is p false?” is equivalent to asking “Is ¬p true?”. In symbols: q2(p) =
q1(¬p); likewise, answering “p is false” is equivalent to answering “¬p is true”.
In symbols: a2(p) = a1(¬p) = 1.
2. Entrenchment, Embeddability, and Iterability
We begin by considering, and challenging, the three major arguments against
rejectivism given in [32]. These are not supposed to be exhaustive of the pos-
sible arguments against rejectivism, but they serve to sharpen and motivate
the desiderata for our generalised version of rejectivism.
10This bears some resemblance to Restall’s construction [23] in terms of bi-theories. But
note that we do not write-in restrictions on combinations of valuations by means of struc-
tural rules.
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2.1. Entrenchment (i)
Textor [32, p.448] proposes a characterization of declarative speech acts as
follows:
The speech-act of rejection or denial (dissent) is taken to be the
opposite of assertion; rejecting that p is distinct from and more
basic than asserting that it is not the case that p.
Let us make use of our formalism to clarify this definition. By an assertion
(rejection), it is meant a yes-(no-)answer to a question concerning a given
sentence p. Then for any ith question about p, we have respectively ai(p) = 1
for assertion and ai(p) = 0 for rejection. Their “opposition” lies in the single
values 1 and 0, accordingly, while nothing is yet said about the opposition
between the sentences p and ¬p. The core point of rejectivism outlined by
Textor is that ai(p) = 0 is more basic than ai(¬p) = 1, because ¬p proceeds
from p by its negative assertion. With this depiction we agree wholeheartedly.
However, Textor goes on to add the following bivalentist assumptions to his
characterisation of rejectivism:
a rejectivist account of the meaning of “It is not the case that”
would be given along the following lines: “It is not the case that
p” is correctly assertible iff “p” is correctly deniable. “It is not the
case that p” is correctly deniable iff “p” is correctly assertible.
In a nutshell, Textor claims that every assertion of a given sentence ¬p is
tantamount to a denial of its opposite affirmative sentence p:
1. ai(¬p) = 1⇔ ai(p) = 0
But, this assumption is not neutral, since a paraconsistent agent takes into
account evidence both for and against p without settling between them, for
want of a definite reason do to that. For them, ai(p) = ai(¬p) = 1 makes sense
and results in a non-bivalent value A(p) = 〈1, 1〉, where the first positive an-
swer a1(p) is about whether p is true and the second, a2(p), is about whether
¬p is true.11 So, (1) holds only in a bivalent domain of values {10, 01}, where
truth- and falsity-claims are exclusive to each other. And, whilst rejectivism
was developed primarily in the context of classical logic, we see little reason to
assume such a bivalent constraint.12 In light of this, we may question what
Textor means by “correctly” in the above definition. For example, if “cor-
rectly” invokes some sort of normality condition for truth-ascription, then it
is arguable that this is inequivalent for different agents (whether bivalentists
or not-bivalentists, including paracompletists and paraconsistentists). Per-
haps, instead, it invokes a “rationally” condition, though this is notoriously
difficult to pin-down.13 Even so, we see at least three different criteria for the
11For the sake of simplicity, we will typically simplify the ordered pair 〈x, y〉 by the notation
xy.
12Though, see [16, 24] for argument in favour of this “negation-equivalence thesis”.
13Though, see [22] for an account of bilateralism in terms of rational “coherence”
conditions.
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correctness for assertion (truth-claims) and rejection (falsity-claims), follow-
ing those given in [26]. Thus, the so-called Bivalentists, Paracompletists and
Paraconsistentists subscribe to distinct conditions of truth-ascription with
variable grades of involvement: strong (truth as a conclusive evidence), mild
(truth as a state of affairs), and weak (truth as an evidence).14 Textor neglects
the occurrence of such various constraints in the theory of meaning, whilst
we will develop these in our generalisation of rejectivism. Let us consider this
in more detail. For example, the second clause of the above quotation may
be formalized as:
2. ai(¬p) = 0⇔ ai(p) = 1
where the values of (1) have been merely permuted. However, a Paracom-
pletist agent may deny p without thereby asserting ¬p, for want of any
conclusive evidence of genuine proof. For them, it is possible that ai(p) =
ai(¬p) = 0, resulting in a non-bivalent value A(p) = {0, 0}. So, (2) holds
only in a bivalent domain of values {10, 01}. Whilst this may hold in some
accounts of rejectivism or bilateralism, we do not accept this constraint here,
wherein denying a sentence is equivalent with asserting its negation. For ex-
ample, take a question:
qi(p)⇒ (a1(p) = 1 or a1(p) = 0).
Following our rejectivist stance, there are two independent answers at hand
to each such question, and what makes an answer “correct” depends upon
the conditions of truth-ascription assumed by the speaker. Also, there are
at least three main sorts of agents characterizing three different criteria of
“correctness” for their statements:
Paracompletists (truth as having a absolute, exclusive evidence)
The agent:
cannot assert both an affirmative sentence p and its negation ¬p:
∀pa1(p) = 1⇒ a2(p) = 0;15
can deny both an affirmative sentence p and its negation ¬p:
∃pa1(p) = a2(p) = 0.
Bivalentists (truth as being the case)
The agent:
cannot assert both an affirmative sentence p and its negation ¬p:
∀pa1(p) = 1⇒ a2(p) = 0;
cannot deny both an affirmative sentence p and its negation ¬p:
∀pa1(p) = 0⇒ a2(p) = 1.
Paraconsistentist (truth as having a relative, inclusive evidence)
The agent:
can assert both an affirmative sentence p and its negation ¬p:
14Relevant discussion of rationality conditions in the context of paraconsistent logic can
be found in [20]. As we show in §4, these difference between agents consists in enlarging
or restricting the set of possible values in our semantics.
15So as to keep notation uncluttered, here, and throughout, we use ⇒ as a metalanguage
symbol expressing the entailment relation to indicate therefore, with interpretation left to
context.
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∃pa1(p) = a2(p) = 1;
cannot deny both an affirmative sentence p and its negation ¬p:
∀pa1(p) = 0⇒ a2(p) = 1.
However stringent or tolerant these criteria of correctness may be, one com-
mon rule is assumed in QAS among all the agents to rule the set of actions
with speech acts. We call this coherence, according to which no speaker can
perform both a given speech-act and its opposite about the same sentence:
∀pai(p) = 1⇔ ai(p) 6= 0.16
It is clear, therefore, that our version of rejectivism is far less restrictive
than that assumed in [32]. For example, our formalism can account for the
following reconstruction of Textor’s defining conditions:
(i)+(ii). “It is not the case that p” is correctly assertible iff “p” is correctly
deniable: a2(p) = 1⇔ a1(p) = 0; that is:
(i). a2(p) = 1⇒ a1(p) = 0, and:
(ii). a1(p) = 0⇒ a2(p) = 1.
(i)+(ii). hold for a bivalentist, but not for a paracompletist and a paracon-
sistentist
(i). holds for a bivalentist and a paracompletist, but not a paraconsistentist
(ii). holds for a bivalentist and a paraconsistentist, but not a paracompletist.
(iii)+(iv). “It is not the case that p” is correctly deniable iff “p” is correctly
assertible: a2(p) = 0⇔ a1(p) = 1; that is:
(iii). a2(p) = 0⇒ a1(p) = 1, and:
(iv). a1(p) = 1⇒ a2(p) = 0.
The same conclusions hold for (iii) and (iv) as for the first quotation (i)-(ii).
So, these various conditions lead to a number of different statements for
the speakers. First, the Paracompletist would say “It is not the case that p”
is correctly assertible only if “p” is correctly deniable. Second, the Bivalen-
tist would say “It is not the case that p” is correctly assertible if and only if
“p” is correctly deniable. And thirdly, the Paraconsistentist would say “It is
not the case that p” is correctly assertible if “p” is correctly deniable. These
differences cannot be ignored from a rejectivist perspective, so to assume Bi-
valentism for this purpose is not an acceptable argument against Rejectivism
in general.
Due to this, although we agree with Textor about the general framework
within which assertion and rejection make sense, we disagree about the way
these are to be used.
2.2. Entrenchment (ii)
Textor also provides an argument against rejectivism by appeal to the use of
“no” in vernacular English. For example, Textor [32] argues that:
The sign of rejection ‘. . . ? No’ is introduced as an abstraction from
a negative answer to a propositional question.
16See also Section 2.1, formula (3) Cf. Rumfitt or Ripley, who mentioned something similar
whilst the latter admits “paracoherence”; see also [33] for a detailed discussion of coherence
and paracoherence in the context of constructive logics.
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We agree, since this accounts for Frege’s famous distinction between “judge-
able contents” (sentences) and “judgments” (statements). For, what Textor
means by a “propositional question” corresponds to what Frege depicted as
an invitation to acknowledge the truth of a thought through the expression
of a sentence, without the latter being already claimed to be true or false. In
other words, a Fregean sentence p is a propositional question “p?” and the
sense of a statement in QAS: q(p).
However, we depart from Textor regarding the meaning of “no”: “no”
crucially differs from “not”, just as an answer clearly differs from a question.
Indeed, we take the former to be, for example in the case of ¬p, an abstraction
from a propositional question about whether p is rejected (taken to be false).
Then the symbol ‘¬p’ corresponds to ‘q(¬p)’ in our formal language, and it
is still not an answer as it stands. Rather, there are two ways of rejecting p:
either by asserting its falsity or by rejecting its truth, keeping in mind that
both answers are different (pace Textor’s previous bivalent characterization
of rejectivism). This stands in opposition to Textor’s assumption that only
one sense of “no” prevails in ordinary language:
Our understanding of this sign and the plausibility of the claim
that it is a sign of rejection depends on our prior understanding of
the English word ‘no’ in its use in answering propositional ques-
tions (. . . ).
To this, we reply in two ways. On the one hand, the prominent role given by
Textor to ordinary language in order to make his point against rejectivism is
at odds with another broader purpose of formalization, namely: regimenta-
tion. This has been stressed by Incurvati & Smith [11, p.226], concerning the
legitimate arbitrariness of denial as a abstract sign in logical theories. Mak-
ing use of the vernacular allows Textor to apply a kind of reductio argument
against any minor uses of “no”. But, consider the case of a mere withdrawl,
as symbolized by the third “gappy” value in many-valued systems (typically
symbolised by n, 1/2 or i). Should the anti-rejectivists discard the existence
of such non-classical values to make their point? It does not seem so, since
these non-bivalent values are so firmly entrenched in the history of logic
(from Aristotle’s sea-battle onwards) that we hardly see how denial could be
ignored in its natural and intuitive occurrence as a mere absence of judgment
or non-commitment.17
As such, Textor’s criterion of linguistic entrenchment cannot but favor
Bivalentism and anti-rejectivism, where yes and no-answers are not taken
to be independent from each other. We take this logical dependence to be
traced back to Grice’s Maxim of Quantity: that, as a matter of fact, we do
17This garners support from the well-known pragmatic ambiguity of ordinary language
negation. See [31] for cases in which the use of “not” in a natural language context indicates
the rejection of an assertion without also indicating the assertion of the negation of the
relevant sentence; e.g. “Some men are not chauvinists. All of them are”, “John isn’t wily
or crazy. He’s wily and crazy”.
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not answer “no” without thereby committing to the truth-value of the ques-
tioned sentence. This echoes Frege’s equivalence Thesis, exemplified by the
preceding formulas (1) and (2). But, a common example may show how our
natural phrasing leads one astray with bivalent-minded words. For example,
the vacillating expression “yes and no” does not mean what it overtly says:
it does not mean both a yes- and no-answer to one and the same answer:
3. ai(p) = {1, 0}
but, rather, two yes-answers to the separate questions about p’s truth
and its opposite ¬p:
4. a1(p) = a2(¬p) = 1
as the case is when a speaker is undecided about p, so sustaining the
weak statement A(p) = 1, 1. In other words, the words “no” in “yes and no”
may allude to a “yes”-answer related to the opposite sentence. It “can” or
“ought to” do so, if we take (3) to be a genuine principle of incorrectness (as
we will).
Consider, further, the role of vernacular expressions that Textor uses to
support his anti-rejectivism. For example, Textor refers to the OED in order
to explain the meaning of yes-answer:
The OED says: Yes: In answer to a question not involving a neg-
ative; standing for the affirmative sentence corresponding to the
interrogative one constituting the question: ‘It is so’.
Actually, the aforementioned definition may hold in English but not in other
natural languages. In which case, not every ordinary yes-no answer complies
with the same rules in different natural languages. For example, Russian
speakers can give a yes-answer (“da”) to confirm a propositional question
that involves a negative statement.18 To the question “You haven’t done your
homework, have you?”, the response may be “yes”, to validate the content
of that propositional question involving a negation; in the contrary case, the
response may be “no”, to invalidate the reproach implied by the questioner.19
So, a Russian speaker answers positively to confirm the speaker’s opinion that
¬p is true, where English speakers would normally say “no”.20
Here is a fruitful feature of entrenched (but not regimented) yes-no
answers: Russian answers are about speakers’ statements, rather than the
sentential content stated. In a nutshell, Russian speakers say “yes” or “no”
in order to express bare agreement or disagreement, respectively and regard-
less of the logical form of the sentence. This also suggests that the question is
not plainly univocal. Indeed, there seems to be a relevant difference between
18By “yes” here, we mean the type particle indicating affirmation, i.e. the positive polarity
particle in the Russian language. We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting this
clarification.
19In Russian, this is either “vi nie sdielali” (polite form), or “ti nie sdielal” (colloquial
form). In full; “Ti nie sdielali svayou damachnyouyou rabotou, nie tak li?”
20We use the Russian sample here only as a way to question Textor’s view of the no-answer.
However, it is worth clarifying that we want to deal with yes- and no-answers as a form of
universal linguistic mechanism.
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two sorts of questions about a given sentence ¬p, namely: question as an
information-seeking device, where the questioner doubts whether ¬p is the
case; and question as a confirmation-seeking device, where the questioner be-
lieves that ¬p is the case (or, equivalently, p is not the case). Russian speakers
would answer “da” to confirm (the truth of) ¬p in the second case, whence
the meaning of “da” and “net” correspond to confirmation and refutation of
sentential contents. Accordingly, we think that there is little symmetry be-
tween natural languages in this respect. For example, in the example above,
a French affirmative “si” rejects ¬p, and corresponds to the Russian “net”;
in symbols: a1(¬p) = a2(p) = 0. Whereas, the French “non” confirms ¬p and
corresponds to the Russian “da”; in symbols: a1(¬p) = a2(p) = 1.
So, at the least, Textor’s argument from the vernacular is on less than
stable ground. On consideration of Textor’s entrenchment argument, our first
conclusion is that vernacular language is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition to conclude that “no” equates with negative assertion. Let us now
turn to Textor’s argument from embeddability.
2.3. Embeddability
According to Textor [32, p.448], no logical term can operate as a force-
indicator once embedded into a sentence:
Non-embeddability. Force-indicators cannot be embedded. If ‘¬’ is a sign of
rejection in a language L, sentences of the form ‘¬p’ never occur as
semantically significant parts of complex sentences of L.
We take non-embeddability to be an unjustified assumption. However, this
is dialectically tricky, since it is also accepted in the rejectivist literature,
so, we must explore this further. Rejectivism has typically relied upon a
distinction between force and content, and, since embedding force “makes”
force into a content (by the definition of embedding), this distinction would
fail should force be embeddable. There is, nonetheless, a possible route around
this argument by paying closer attention to the roles of force in the context
of questions and answers. For example, according to Textor;
The article “yes” is a prosentence, and if “yes” is a prosentence,
“no” should also be one. Answering “no” is another way of assert-
ing “It is not so”.
Rather, we reverse these terms: affirmation is a prostatement ; and if affir-
mation is a prostatement, then negation should also a prostatement within
sentences. On this view, uttering “not” (in a question) is a shorter way of
asking “Is it not the case that . . . ?”.
First, let us explain two neologisms with the required caution any such
process should demand: prostatement, and proto-statement. Unlike Bolzano’s
prosentence, by a “prostatement”, we mean the status of the expressions
“yes” and “no” when occurring as a placeholder for a whole statement. By a
“proto-statement”, we mean the status of these expressions when embedded
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into a statement such as a conditional or disjunction.21 These are not yet
speech-acts, but they come to be so sooner or later, if the whole statement
makes sense by its use. That is to say, sentences are nothing but proto-
statements, i.e. informative items that occur in communication to express
information, whether asserted or not. A sentence proceeds as a pro-statement,
in the sense that its role is to be used later on in the form of an assertion or
a rejection. For what is the point of asserting e.g. “if p then q”, if p and q
are never asserted separately?22 This means that the content of a statement
must become asserted itself, following the definition of meaning as use (and
given compositionality).
This coheres with a wider point of view that the difference between
sentences and statements is essential to characterize logic as a set of actions
upon sentences. By means of our distinction between a proto-statement and
a prostatement, the issue of embeddability may be overcome by introducing a
more dynamic understanding of the relationship between sentences and state-
ments within complex sentences such as conditionals. Thus, force-indicators
can be embedded as proto-statements rather than prostatements: the former
are not still asserted or rejected by the speaker, but they come to be so sooner
or later, thereby turning into the latter expressions.
The symbolism of QAS makes a distinction between sentences and state-
ments in terms of questions and answers, respectively, and in accordance with
Frege’s claim by analogy with the pattern of scientific inquiry.23 So, letting
p stand for “John is the murderer”, we have the corresponding data:
“Is John the murderer?”
i.e. the proposition that John is a murderer: q1(p)
24
“Is John not the murderer?”
i.e. the proposition that John is not the murderer: q1(¬p) = q2(p)
“John is the murderer”: a1(p) = 1
i.e. “Yes, it is the case that John is the murderer”
“John is not the murderer”
21Dummett’s [3] distinction between ingredient sense and assertoric content may be un-
derstood as a precursor to the distinction that we make here. For further discussion in
support of the distinction, see [34].
22We propose to extend the current account to deal with subjunctive conditionals in further
work. However, we note here that, as an anonymous reviewer points out, subjunctive
conditionals seem problematic for our account of proto-statements since one can have
meaningful discourse involving counterfactual sentences that are never asserted as true. Our
response is two-fold. First, even if counterfactuals were to resist our treatment of the Frege-
Geach problem, this would not undermine the account of ordinary conditionals. Second,
we think that counterfactuals may be treated similarly to suppositional conditionals, in
which to test the meaning of a such conditionals, we would “suppose” the antecendent to
hold, to test whether the conditional itself holds, dependent upon the antecendent holding
in a suppositional context.
23For example, in “Negation” [9], Frege states that: ‘A propositional question (Satzfrage)
contains a demand that we should either acknowledge the truth of a thought, or reject it
as false’ (117).
24This corresponds to Frege’s Gedanke.
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i.e. “Yes, it is the case that John is not the murderer”: q1(¬p) =
q2(p) = 1
The main difficulty is of a vernacular order, whenever a “no”-answer is given
to such questions. Although Textor [32] rightly notes that the main use of a
negative answer is intended to confirm the truth of a negative sentence, above
we said that this is not the only available meaning in which a no-answer can be
used. Roughly speaking, a no-answer as a rejection is strong when expressed
by “no, it is not the case that . . . ”; and weak when expressed by “no, I do
not assert that it is the case that . . . ”.25 The more complex structure of weak
rejection echoes with our plea for the iterability of force-indicators, and also
makes room for a second sense of rejection as non-commitment, rather than
commitment to the truth of ¬p.
This explanation can be clarified through a brief analysis of the con-
ditional. It is notoriously tricky to understand how we should be capable
of asserting conditionals “conditionally”, so to speak. For example, it seems
intuitively incorrect to think a conditional, α → β, is the sort of thing that
is simply asserted, especially when the antecedent α is known to be false.
Rather, as Humberstone [10] suggests, after Ramsey [21], to assert a condi-
tional is not to be thought of as asserting a conditional proposition, but to
make a conditional assertion of the consequent: ‘If the latter condition is not
satisfied (i.e., if the antecedent is false), then it is as though no assertion had
been made. A parallel can be made with conditional bets, which are void in
that no money changes hands unless the condition they are conditional upon
obtains’ (p.938). Edgington [6] goes further still: ‘to assert a conditional is
to assert that it is true on condition that it has a truth value. To believe a
conditional is to believe that it is true on the supposition that it has a truth
value. It has a truth value iff its antecedent is true’. The interpretation is also
argued for by Quine in [36, §3]:
An affirmation of the form If α then β is commonly felt less as
an affirmation of a conditional than as a conditional affirmation
of the consequent. If, after we have made such an affirmation, the
antecedent turns out true, then we consider ourselves committed
to the consequent, and are ready to acknowledge error if it proves
false. If on the other hand the other hand the antecedent turns out
to have been false, our conditional affirmation is as if it had never
been made.
We think that this view of conditionals holds more widely, and requires a
distinction between proto- and pro-statements.26 As such, our explanation is
analogous to a conditional bet of the form “I bet that if p, then q”, where the
25Recall Grice’s Maxim of Quantity, discussed above, which provides explanation for why
most, but not all, “no”-answers function as strong rejections.
26This also clarifies our underlying inferentialist approach to logic, in the sense that we
require evidence for truth. Indeed, unlike orthodox readings of Quine’s argument, for us
“conditional on the truth” means the same as “if asserted by the speaker”, rather than
taking truth and falsity to be objective truth-values that are properties of propositions.
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condition on which the bet rests is not a truth but a potential speech act, i.e.
a proto-statement. Imagine a case in which the antecedent of a conditional is
true (i.e., it is the case that p, in “if p, then q”), but the speaker does not know
it to be so. Should the speaker assert the consequent under the pretext that
they assert that if p then q? We do not think that this is the case since the
speaker still denies p. In other words, our replacement of truth by affirmation
helps to avoid a case of logical omniscience, so that, if I assert that (if p, then
q), I am not required to assert q from p’s truth even without asserting p. Once
this distinction between proto- and pro- statements is allowed, embeddability
is no longer the strict criteria once thought, since we also need to take into
account the dynamics of use.
The distinction is mirrored by the shift from the protostatement, as
conditional, and the prostatement, as implication, by dint of the deduction
theorem. In many logics, the deduction theorem allows us to identify a proof
with a deduction from the empty set, and a theorem as the last item in
that proof.27 As is known since Herbrand, to prove that deduction theorem
holds requires induction on successive uses of Modus Ponens from the axioms,
so, in effect, this process requires us to shift assumptions successively over
to the r.h.s of the turnstile, removing the hypotheses and treating them
as theorems. Perhaps more than other formulations, the categorical version
of the single-premise deduction theorem makes this transparent. Take 1 to
indicate algebraic top, then say that for any propositional formulas α and β,
if there exists a derivation of 1 β from the assumption 1 α, then there
exists a derivation of α β [13, p.50]. The illusion that this brings with it
lies in the ease with which this appears to shift from the hypothetical to the
actual form, which is surely one of the morals of Carroll’s tale: that there
is a distinction between the action of an inference, and a relation between
propositional contents. One mistake identified in Carroll’s story is to think
that to infer β from α and α → β requires an agent to believe “(α ∧ (α ⇒
β)) ⇒ β)”. The latter may, rather, be that which may be the content of a
belief following the act of making the inference itself.
2.4. Iterability
An additional issue is the criterion of iterability, the failure of which is said
to follow from the aforementioned failure of embeddability in Textor [32]:
Iterability. [If − were a sign for rejection] “−” is also non-iterable in L: there
are no sentences of the form “−− p” etc. in L.
Whilst our plea for embeddability allows that proto-statements (but not
prostatements) can be embedded into a pro-statement, iterability means that
componing protostatements can be iterated into a whole prostatement. This
has been commonly viewed as an absurd device, even by the rejectivists who
rule out any introduction of assertions or rejections within another, such as:
“I assert that I assert that p”, or “I assert that I deny that p”.
27See [5] for a similar formulation and extended discussion of deduction theorem.
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Here is one way of avoiding this criterion. Borrowing from modal logics
or quantification theory, the operator endowed with the largest scope plays
the same role as a prostatement, while the embedded (and possibly) iterated
ones proceed as proto-statements. For instance, in “a knows that a does not
know that p” (in symbols: Ka¬Kap), we have a knowledge-statement about
a case of non-knowledge. The latter also stands for a statement, once the
largest operator is eliminated through the inference rule of factivity (Kp ⊃ p),
viz. Ka¬Kap ⊃ ¬Kap. It is not typically thought that such an expression
of ignorance is not an epistemic act once embedded into a larger one. We
apply the same formal treatment to speech acts and, by doing so, propose an
answer to the Frege-Geach problem and Textor’s objections. It is not possible
to iterate an act since they are expressive in the context of prostatements,
whilst in protostatements, there is rather the description of an act which may
then be iterated in much the same way as modal or epistemic operators. That
is to say, when a judgment is embedded, it is not a judgment any longer, since
it becomes a sentential content. It is in this way that we can make sense of
embeddability, since it is not strictly speaking a judgment that is embedded.
Let us examine these objections. By “cannot be”, is it said that any form
of embedding or iteration is nonsense? Is it logically, conceptually, or epis-
temically impossible to have such a well-formed formula in a given language?
None of these are obviously the case. For example, consider an assertoric
version of excluded middle, “I assert p, or I deny p”, which is a sentence of a
given language comprising two speech-acts:
5. p or p
In QAS, this is:
a1(p) = 1 or a1(p) = 0
We may also point to the device of introducing metalinguistic symbols in the
object-language by means of “internalization” [17, 37]. In [37], von Wright
considers T and F to be constructed as unary operators of truth and falsity,
respectively. In this context, there seems little difference between (5) and the
formula Tp∨¬Tp of von Wright’s logic. Now, consider the statement “It is not
true that it is not true that p”, which is just a rephrasing of what is supposed
to be nonsense according to Textor. But, it seems we can make sense of this
by introducing a truth operator as ¬T¬Tp. Again, embedding and iteration
can be observed both in truth-logics and modal logics in general.
The present analogy between the two sorts of logical systems is pur-
ported to show that speech acts can be also embedded and iterated without
“changing their meaning”, as Textor puts it, and the Frege-Geach problem
alludes to.28 Nonetheless, in making this argument, Textor refers to Rumfitt’s
[25] argument regarding non-iterability. There, Rumfitt argues as follows:
28This is not to say that these unary operators are modal operators. Rather, a number
of counterintuitive results can be found in the literature against a modal treatment of
many-valued systems, especially concerning the distribution of modalities over conditional
or disjunction. For discussion, see [7] and [1].
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Is it the case that two is not a prime number? No” makes perfectly
good sense, but “Is it the case that it is the case that two is a
prime number? No? No” is gibberish. The sign “–”, then, does not
contribute to propositional content, but indicates the force with
which that content is promulgated. (pp.802-3)
The use of such double negative expressions may strike one as very coun-
terintuitive. Though, again, there is an analogy to be made with modal sys-
tems such as epistemic or alethic logics, where such awkward but meaningful
formulas as “I know that I know that I know that p” or “It is necessarily
impossibly necessary that possibly p” are logically well-formed. If the latter
are taken to be meaningful, despite their unusual occurrence in the natural
language, we think that this should equally be the case for iterated speech
acts. To a degree, Rumfitt’s argument against iteration is on a par with a
reduction thesis, in order to simplify and make corresponding formulas more
intelligible. But, that they are only vaguely intelligible at first utterance does
not make them meaningless.
Despite appearances, the sentence quoted by Rumfitt is not “gibberish”
from a logical point of view, but rather appears to be meaningless only due to
its unusual grammar. For, “Is it the case that it is the case that two is a prime
number? No? No” can be split into a question and an answer. The question
goes from the initial sentence to the question mark, and can be rephrased as
a negative question including a affirmative sentence as: “Is it the case that
it is the case that two is a prime number?”. The answer is negative: it is a
no-answer expressed by the exclamation mark. That is: “No, it is not the case
that is the case that two is a prime number”. The main problem with such
an intricate sentence lies in the embedded form of the question: “it is not
the case that it is the case”. But again, a parallel with modal logics shows
that reduction laws help to disentangle these heavy formulations by render-
ing them equivalent with simpler expressions. In epistemic logic, for instance,
iterated knowledge can be reduced to mere knowledge by applying the theo-
rems S4 or S5. To sum up: we agree with Rumfitt that we may consider only
one speech act at once in the case of iterated formula; we disagree that the
narrow operators do not stand for speech acts any longer, just as the second
modal operator K2 still stands for a proper operator of knowledge in the
iterative formula K1K2p. The upshot is that any simultaneous iterability is
not possible, in the same sense that the formulas Ka¬Kap (or T¬Tp) cannot
express both knowledge and non-knowledge (or truth and about non-truth)
with respect to the same sentence p. But, this does not rule out iterability
tout-court, provided that the distinction between proto- and pro-statements
is clarified.
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3. The Frege-Geach problem
We are now in a position to draw these arguments together in order to con-
sider the way in which Textor [32] addresses the infamous Frege-Geach prob-
lem. First, consider Frege’s test for force-indicators as utilised by Textor [32]:
If it is claimed that E is a force-indicator, try to embed it in the
antecedent of a conditional. If you can do this without changing
the meaning of E, E has no assertoric force.
The construal of “meaning”, here, in keeping with the original motivation for
rejectivism, will presumably have the sense of inferential role or use. Then, the
idea is that, whoever embeds an assertion (or rejection) inside a conditional
sentence must inevitably change the inferential role of the conditional as it
stands. We provide reason to think that this is not the case, by formalising
Textor’s examples by means of QAS, after first reviewing the Fregean context
of the argument.
Textor begins his analysis as follows:
For instance, does “is true” indicate assertoric force? No, it is con-
tained in the antecedent of the conditional “If it is true that John
is the murderer, Peter is innocent”, but the antecedent is not as-
serted, only the whole conditional is.
Importantly, we suspect Textor to assume a difference between the expres-
sions “If it is true that John is the murderer, Peter is innocent” and “It is
true that if John is the murderer, Peter is innocent”. We see none. That is, “it
is true” is not really embedded into the entire conditional. Such a vernacular
argument is captious with respect to the criterion of embedding. For instance,
our formalization of Textor’s sentence can be depicted in three different ways
in AR4 (with p for “John is the murderer, and q for “Peter is innocent”):
6. If it is true that John is the murderer, Peter is innocent
(a) a1(p ⊃ q) = 1
(b) a1(p) = 1⇒ a1(q) = 1
(c) (a1(p) = 1) ⊃ q
(6b) is nothing but the metalinguistic formulation of the clause for the
assertibility-conditions of the conditional, corresponding to Modus Ponens.
Not only are (6a) and (6b) equivalent with each other, from our inferential
view of meaning for logical constants, but also, they nicely exemplify the
embeddability of force-indicators in (6b) through the force of assertion. Is
the latter really embedded in (6b) though? Isn’t it rather the whole condi-
tional (p ⊃ q) that has force, separately from a “conditional force” inside
the conditional? Once again, our reply is that a genuine force is expressed by
prostatements, whilst conditional force is rendered inside proto-statements.
A proto-statement comes to be a statement once the whole statement is
used for the normal and essential purpose of logic, i.e. drawing conclusions
by implementing the components as separate speech-acts (whether asserted
or denied). At the same time, (6c) is not a well-formed formula since ques-
tions and answers are interrelated there: the first component is an answer,
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expressed by means of a statement and belonging to the metalanguage; the
second component is a question, expressed by means of a sentence and be-
longing to the object-language The latter corresponds to what Textor has in
mind with his “if yes”-phrase, whereas we take (6) to be correctly symbolized
by both (6a) and (6b).
Returning to the connection between embeddability and iterability, our
previous comparison between force-indicators and unary operators makes a
link between the two rules of detachment and distributivity: just as q can be
detached from p in the Modus Ponens, assertion can be distributed on the
sentences p and q once conditional is asserted itself. If we refer to the condi-
tional force of components, these become proper forces after being detached
from that which plays initially the role of antecedent p, in the proto-statement
“if p, then q”, and then the role of a premise in the prostatement “p, there-
fore q”. We may consider Textor’s additional examples similarly to merely
presuppose what is to be proved by concrete cases of negative assertion:
1. Is this tree deciduous? If yes, go to #2. If no, go to #4.
2. Are the leaves heart-shaped? If yes, this is a quaking pen. If no,
go to #3.
Importantly, in 1. and 2. “yes” and “no” have the grammatical
role of complete sentences.
We disagree about the claim that “yes” and “no” are embedded here, and we
propose an alternative formalization of 1. and 2. Let p stand for “this tree
is deciduous” or “the leaves are heart-shaped”, q for “go to #2” or “this is
quaking pen”, and r for “go to #4” or “go to #3”. It results in the following
common question-answer game in AR4:
7. Is it the case that p? If yes, then it is the case that q. If no, then it is
the case that r.
(a) q(p)
(b) a1(p ⊃ q) = 1⇔ a1(p) = 1⇒ a1(q) = 1
(c) a1(¬p ⊃ r) = 1⇔ a1(¬p) = 1⇒ a1(r) = 1
The last two formulas have the same logical form, the sole difference
lying in the use of a negative antecedent in (8c). There is no difference between
this example and the preceding Frege’s test (7a)-(7c), so our conclusion will
not differ from it.
A further example given by Textor insists upon the troublesome distinc-
tion between non-committed sentences and committed statements, namely:
(P1) Is this tree deciduous? If no, go to #4.
(P2) No.
Therefore:
(C) Go to #4. (. . . )
If “no” had different meaning in (P1) and (P2), we would commit
a fallacy of equivocation. “No” must have the same meaning in
(P1) and (P2). So if “no” is not a force-indicator in (P1), it cannot
be one in (P2).
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Our formalization for this case is another instance of Modus Ponens:
(P1) q(p),a1(¬p ⊃ q) = 1⇔ (a1(¬p) = 1⇒ a1(q) = 1)
(P2) a1(¬p) = 1
(C) a1(q) = 1
The equivalence relation between detached assertions in (P1) means that
“no” is embedded into two different formulas with one and the same meaning
in use, insofar as meaning is given as a set of norms for assertibility and
deniability-conditions. If so, then “no” does proceed as a force-indicator in
(P1) too, just as K2 occurs as a box-operator in K1K2p, in epistemic logic.
Consequently, there is no fallacy of equivocation.
4. A rejectivist-minded semantics
4.1. The logical system: AR4
We briefly sketch the Logic of Acceptance and Rejection (AR4), a 4-valued
system based on the exhaustive set of four independent answers to proposi-
tional questions. Its language contains a set of sentences and a set of logical
constants, namely: negation, conjunction, disjunction, and conditional, with
the usual syntactic rules for well-formed formulas. Despite its striking resem-
blance with Belnap’s First-Degree Entailment, it differs from it by including
an alternative definition of conditional. Moreover, the distinction between
speakers and their distinctive constraints upon correctness is rendered by a
distinction in their domains of valuation. Following the preceding section,
AR4 may be adapted to paracomplete, bivalent, and paraconsistent agents
as follows:
V4 = {11, 10, 01, 00}
Paracompletism: V3- = {10, 01, 00}
Bivalentism: V2 = {10, 01}
Paraconsistentism: V3+ = {11, 10, 01}
The following logical system AR4 is a language based on a general question-
answer framework ARnm: to a given ordered set of n questions corresponds an
ordered set of of m kinds of answers given by an agent-speaker. The number
of questions and answers relies upon the sentence in consideration, depending
upon the degree of complexity of the information it conveys. In the present
case, two questions are about an arbitrary sentence φ, namely: Is it true?
Is it false? Let us notice that the model at hand is reminiscent of Belnap’s
First Degree Entailment, where truth and falsity do not mean the existence
of facts but, rather, the occurrence of data for or against the corresponding
sentence. Two kinds of answers are to be given to each of these two questions:
yes, or no.
The logical system FDE of Belnap (1977) can be easily adapted by
means of this dialogical modelization of information. Let A(φ) = 〈a1(φ),a2(φ)〉
be the logical value of an arbitrary sentence φ, where A is a valuation function
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such that A: φ 7→ {1,0}×{1,0} (0 for the negative answer no, 1 for the positive
answer yes).
The set of Belnap’s basic four truth-values yields the following four
structured values: T = 〈1, 0〉, F = 〈0, 1〉, B = 〈1, 1〉, N = 〈0, 0〉, thereby
justifying the heading ARnm = AR
2
2 = AR4 of our many-valued logic of in-
formation.
A major difference between FDE and AR4 concerns the relation of
consequence, especially the logical relation obtaining between the four
truth-values. In FDE, there is a partial ordering relation between T, F, B,
and N; this order is depicted notably in Ginsberg (1988) by a bi-lattice
coposed of two distinctive ranges: the range of truth t, and the range of
information i. In this two-tiered lattice, two independent ordering relations
are to be distinguished from each other:
T >t B >t F
T >t N >t F,
wherein B and N are incomparable with respect to ¿t (the one is not “truer”
than the other).
B >i T >t N
T >i F >t N,
wherein T and F are incomparable with respect to >i (the one is not more
informative than the other).
Lattice theory plays a major role in the algebraic definition of Tarskian
consequence, insofar as the relation φ |=t/i ψ holds if and only if v(φ) <t/i
v(ψ). At the same time, there is no ordering relation in AR4: each logical
value is independent from the three other ones, and the sole relevant notion
to characterize the relation of consequence is that of designatedness: φ |=t/i
ψ holds if and only if A(φ)∈D whenever A(ψ)∈D, D symbolizing the set of
designated truth-values such that D = {10, 11}.
The set of logical constants occurring in AR4 is characterized similarly
to those of FDE, with the notable exception of conditionals. The set of sen-
tences of AR4 are to be construed in accordance to the Backus-Naur form:
φ := p — ¬φ — φ ∧ ψ — φ ∨ ψ — φ → ψ
These logical constants are defined with the help of the Boolean
operators u and unionsq applied to answer values 1 and 0, such that 1u0 = 0u1
= 0u0 = 0 and 1unionsq0 = 0unionsq1 = 1unionsq1 = 1. The definitions are given as follows,
where the symbols of the logical values are simplied in the general form
〈x, y〉 = xy. For any sentence A(φ) = 〈a1(φ),a2(φ)〉:
Atoms: A(p) = 1, 1 or A(p) = 1, 0 or A(p) = 0, 1 or A(p) = 0, 0;
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Negation: A(¬ϕ) = 〈a2(ϕ), a1(ϕ)〉;
Conjunction: A(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 〈a1(ϕ) u a1(ψ), a2(ϕ) unionsq a2(ψ)〉;
Disjunction: A(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 〈a1(ϕ) unionsq a1(ψ), a2(ϕ) u a2(ψ)〉;
Implication: A(ϕ→ ψ) = 〈a1(ϕ) u a1(ψ), a1(ϕ) u a2(ψ)〉;
The characteristic matrices for the above constants are similar to those
of FDE, assuming a transcription of the symbolic letters in Belnap (1977)
into structured values of AR4.
¬
11 11
10 01
01 10
00 00
∧ 11 10 01 00
11 11 11 01 01
10 11 10 01 00
01 01 01 01 01
00 01 00 01 00
∨ 11 10 01 00
11 11 10 11 10
10 10 10 10 10
01 11 10 01 00
00 10 10 00 00
→ 11 10 01 00
11 11 10 01 00
10 10 10 00 00
01 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00
Fig. 1: Matrices for AR4
Similarly, AR4 is endowed with a set of axioms and corresponding
tableaux just as in FDE, with the notable exception of inference rules for
implication: the specific behavior of the latter in AR4 is such that the so-
called paradoxes of material implication are overcome there; however, this
does not prevent its main properties to be preserved, viz. Modus Ponens
(MP) and Modus Tollens (MT).29
The conditional is the main innovation of AR4, insofar as its
assertibility-conditions are strengthened with respect to the mainstream def-
inition. Here, a conditional cannot be asserted once either of its components
is not also asserted. This complies with our preceding view of conditionality
as a commitment upon its terms, so that the whole should be rejected once
either of its components does. Above all, such an intuitive characterization of
conditional can make sense only if rejectivism is admitted: without a clear-
cut separation of assertion- and rejection-conditions, it clearly appears that
our conditional would collapse into the other constant of conjunction, given
that a1(p ∧ q) = a1(p → q). The crucial difference is made in the level of
their rejection-conditions, since a2(p∧ q) 6= a2(p→ q). The last main feature
of AR4 concerns its main relation, namely: consequence. What does it does
mean exactly, from a rejectivist point of view?
4.2. Rejectivist consequence
Usually, logical consequence is defined as a relation of truth-preservation
from the premises to the consequence. But the situation cannot be depicted
29In §4.4, we consider the difficulty of formalizing MT from a bilateralist perspective. We
aim to develop a natural deduction framework for AR4 in further work, using a framework
combining derivations for proofs with derivations for refutations, analogous to the approach
in [35].
22 Fabien Schang and James Trafford
so simply in AR4: truth and falsity are made independent from each other,
so that the speech-acts of assertion and rejection may have their own sets
of preservation-conditions. Preservation of what, actually? If, as we argued
for until here, the act of rejection does not depend from its dual opposite of
assertion, some asymmetry should arise between the two logics of asserting
and rejection. For instance, it is not because p is rejected that its negation ¬p
should be rejected at once. On the basis of our partition between assertion
rules (whether positive about truth, or negative about falsity) and rejection
rules, at least four different theories of preservation or not-preservation can
be devised to characterize the logics of assertion and rejection. Namely:
Logic 1: theory of truth-preservation
Logic 2: theory of falsity-preservation
Logic 3: theory of truth-non-preservation
Logic 4: theory of falsity-non-preservation.30
The first two logics deal with assertion and strong rejection, respectively,
whereas the last two ones with assertion and weak rejection.
4.3. Bilateralism and bivalentism
Smith and Incurvati [11] reconstruct Textor’s arguments by means of the
signed calculus, in which the symbols “+” and “–” appended to sentences
express their assertion and rejection, respectively. Then, against Textor’s ex-
clusive interpretation of “no” as a statement of negative assertion in (P2),
i.e. +(¬p), it is noted that:
there is another possible explanation of the validity of [the decid-
uous tree argument] – one that does not require “no” to have the
same meaning in (P1) and (P2). For here is another regimentation:
(P1′) +(¬p→ q)
(P2′) −p
(C′) Therefore: +q
And this is an inference that the bilateralist recognizes as valid.31
However, two problems arise from the above explanation. First, what is the
intended difference between −p and +(¬p), if both lead to the same conclu-
sion? Second, why should q be asserted once p is denied in (P2′)? We agree
with the above distinction between two sorts of rejection −(p) and +(¬p),
against Textor’s anti-rejectivist reading of “no”. However, we disagree with
the above argument. For, on our view, denying the antecedent entails that
the entire conditional relation is cancelled. To be more precise about this
game-type account of conditionality, let us see a conditional as a commit-
ment, which comes to commit the speaker to assert the antecedent. Here
is our alternative analysis of the preceding argument (P1′)-(C′) in terms of
weak denial −(p) in QAS:
(P1′′) a1(¬p→ q) = 1⇔ (a1(¬p) = 1⇒ a1(q) = 1)
(P2′′) a1(p) = 0
30Related constructions can be found in [8, 14, 27, 28, 29].
31In QAS, this is: (P1’) a1(¬p→ q) = 1; (P2’) a1(p) = 0; (C’) a1(q) = 1.
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(C′′) a1(¬p→ q) = 0
There is no contradiction between (P1′′) and (C′′), despite the contrary ap-
pearance. This is so, because (P1′′) is a definition of assertion rather than a
commitment to its antecedent. A conditional is asserted only in cases when
both antecedent and consequent are asserted, so, if the antecedent is not
asserted, then the entire conditional is also not asserted, without invalidat-
ing the conditional. Given that the latter is denied by the second judgment
(P2′′), it follows from this inferential explanation of conditional speech-acts
that the entire conditional is ruled out accordingly.32
Later, Incurvati & Smith [11] go on to contest Textor’s exclusive use
of “no” as a negative assertion while assuming a bivalentist question-answer
game:
In fact, the bilateralist can explain its validity in more basic terms.
For, first, bilateral systems include the following rule:
(+¬I) −α; +(¬α)
And in passing, let’s remark that bilateral systems will also include
the converse rule.33
How can (+¬I) be accepted without entailing anti-rejectivism? It seems per-
fectly acceptable for a Bivalentist as:
(−I) +(¬α); −α34
But, we hardly see how this should be the case for a non-Bivalentist. For
example, (+¬I) may be accepted by Paraconsistentists, but not its converse;
on the other hand, (−I) is accepted by Paracompletists, but not its converse.
So, either rejectivists are considered automatically to be bivalentist, or they
are not, in which case the equation of rejectivism with bivalentism in Textor
and in Incurvati and Smith should itself be rejected.35
4.4. Reduction and rejectivism
Somehow ironically, Frege’s philosophy of language constitutes both support
and hindrance to the rejectivist. As noted in Incurvati & Smith [11]:
the bilateralist takes the unit of inference to be judgments. From
this point of view, she is closer to Frege than to modern logicians.
32The conditional is itself defined in terms of a biconditional “iff”. Does this entail a
regression argument, insofar as conditional is defined by its own defining words in the
metalanguage? To deal with this problem, which is similar to that with Achille and the
Tortoise (about the process of detachment in Modus Ponens), we have to insist upon the
notion of act in the speech act of assertion. In this respect, the “⇒” is a metalinguistic
symbol of ensuing action after a preceding speech act.
33In AR4, this is: (+¬I) a1(p) = 0; a1(¬p) = a2(p) = 1.
34In QAS, this is: a1(¬α) = a2(α) = 1; a1(α) = 0.
35Whilst it would take us beyond the discussion of this paper, we should also note that
our approach to bilateralism is well positioned to deal with revenge paradoxes that are
identified in relation to self-reference in more standard bilateral logics [15], since we might
invoke our dynamic approach to speech acts to deal with these. We leave this work for a
further paper, however, and thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to
this.
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This is in accord with our view that each sentence is a proto-statement whose
meaning depends upon its use in an inferential process, and also with our view
that “¬p” is just a proto-statement expressing the falsity questioned of p. In
QAS, these form the content of the second question q2(p) characterizing the
meaning of p in Q(p) = 〈q1(p),q2(p)〉. So, a speaker asserts p negatively by
saying “yes” to whether p is not the case; they say “no”, otherwise. Moreover,
let us recall that our valuation is a non-Fregean one in assuming the inde-
pendence of truth and falsity as two possible forms of assertion. This second
feature provides a way of avoiding Frege’s dismissal of rejectivism. The latter
is considered by Incurvarti & Smith [11], as a challenge to the rejectivist:
As a result, however, she has to deal with the difficulties Frege
famously faced in explaining suppositional reasoning: if judgments
are the units of inference, what do we do when we assume some-
thing for reductio?
In our framework, this provides justification for an alternative definition of
a strengthened conditional in AR4, as an operation prefiguring the proto-
statement of inference. For this purpose, we propose an explanation of con-
ditionality on the basis of a comparative analysis of Modus Ponens and
Modus Tollens (or “reductio”) as follows. There can be at least three dif-
ferent versions of Modus Ponens, together with their interpretation in terms
of questions-answers in AR4:
MP1. ((p→ q) ∧ p)→ q
AR4. a1((p→ q) ∧ p)→ q)) = 1
MP2. (p→ q), p q
AR4:. (a1(p→ q) = a1(p) = 1)⇒ a1(q) = 1
MP3. p→ q, p, q
AR4:. (a1(p→ q) = 1,a1(p) = 1)⇒ a1(q) = 1
It is the case that MP1 is invalid in AR4, whenever a1(p) or a1(q) = 0. As for
MP2 and MP3, they are both valid in AR4 and equivalent with each other.
The main advantage of the latter is that these do not include further logical
constants in addition with conditional, thereby providing a “pure” definition
in terms of committal speech-acts of assertion. At the same time, our for-
malism shows that the meaning of Modus Tollens is much more complex and
may give rise to more interpretations in AR4:
MT1. ((p→ q) ∧ ¬q)→ ¬p
AR4:. a1((p→ q) ∧ ¬q)→ ¬p) = 1
MT2. (p→ q),¬q ¬p
AR4:. (a1(p→ q) = a1(¬q) = 1⇒ a1(¬p) = 1
MT3. p→ q, ¬q, ¬p
AR4:. (a1(p→ q) = 1,a1(¬q) = 1)⇒ a1(¬p)
MT4. p→ q, q, p
AR4:. a1(p→ q) = 1,a1(q) = 0⇒ a1(p) = 0
Is “No” a Force-Indicator? 25
MT5. p→ q, p, q
AR4:. a1(p→ q) = a1(p) = 0⇒ a1(q) = 0
MT6. p→ q, q, p
AR4:. a1(p→ q) = a1(q) = 0⇒ a1(p) = 0
We think that the definition of Modus Tollens that coheres best with the
account of the conditional given above, whilst also doing justice to rejectivism,
is MT4. Take, for example, MT5 and MT6. Whilst these engage with the
common actions of denial upon the components p, q of the conditional p→ q,
and negation is not required in these interpretations of Modus Tollens, MT5
does not seem to render the meaning of Modus Tollens adequately. The second
term of the premise is not the initial consequent q, but the antecedent p. So,
a confusion seems to emerge between Modus Tollens and Modus Ponens,
since the conditions under which the two Modi hold rely upon one and the
same component in MT5 and MT6 – the antecedent p, which is asserted in
MP and denied in MT. MT4, on the other hand, requires that, if I assert
that “if p, then q”, and if I reject q, then I must reject p, also. Whilst this
interpretation requires us to include both assertion and rejection within the
same inferential process, this dynamic corresponds to that identified with
the failing bet analysis of conditionals given above. If developed in terms of
a dialogue between two interlocuters, then this “mixed” interpretation may
become more intuitive as a way of thinking of the assertion of a conditional
on behalf of proponent, which leads to a later rejection of the antecedent once
the opponent has provided a successful attack of the consequent. We leave
this issue open, for further development.
5. Conclusion
We have constructed a generalised account of rejectivism by developing the
formal framework of QAS and its ensuing four-valued logic of acceptance and
rejection, AR4. By considering and outlining the flaws in Textor’s arguments
against rejectivism, we have provided a novel approach that challenges long-
standing views regarding the non-embeddability and non-iteratibility of force
indicators. The formalism that we offer not only provides a solid foundation
for a dialogical approach to logic, but we also highlighted several advantages
of our approach to the conditional and an ability to account for distinct
pragmatic models of “correctness”.
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